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Abstract 
We extend the non-binary framework of social choice introduced by Aizerman and 
Aleskerov ( 1986) , in which individual choice functions are aggregated into a social choice 
function, by considering non-monotonic operators. We characterize the class of "local" 
operators and provide the explicit forms of local operators satisfying various combinations 
of normative and rationality conditions in the absence of monotonicity. Surprisingly, the 
restriction of monotonicity is not binding for operators satisfying the usual rationality 
conditions. We identify two rationality restrictions which do admit non-monotonic oper­
ators. One restriction admits every sovereign and neutral operator, and the other admits 
only dictatorship and anti-dictatorship operators. This last result is a direct non-binary 
counterpart to Wilson's (1972) theorem. 
FUNCTIONAL VOTING OPERATORS: THE 
NON-MONOTONIC CASE* 
Fuad Aleskerov John Duggan 
In t'he classic social choice framework introduced by Arrow ( 1963), an individual's 
choice from any set of alternatives is given by a function which maximizes a weak order 
over the universe of alternatives, and social choices are likewise given by a function 
which maximizes a social weak order. Since the preference relation underlying individual 
or social choice can be recovered by presenting the decision-maker with choices over 
all pairs of alternatives, such choice functions are equivalent to the preference relations 
they maximize, and the aggregation of individual choice functions into a social choice 
function reduces to the mapping of individual orders into a social order. Such a mapping 
is a social welfare function. Arrow (1963) shows that the only social welfare functions 
satisfying non-imposedness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and monotonicity 
are dictatorial.1 
In the more general, non-binary framework introduced by Aizerman and Aleskerov 
(1986), the aggregation of individual choice functions into a social choice function is 
performed by a functional voting operator, which does not require either individual or 
social choice functions to maximize a preference relation. As analysis of the class of 
all functional voting operators would be prohibitively difficult, they (as do we) restrict
their attention to operators satisfying a locality condition similar in spirit to Arrow's 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. For the class of local operators, Aizerman and 
Aleskerov characterize the operators satisfying monotonicity in conjunction with various 
other normative conditions. In addition, rationality of social choice is considered in 
the form of domain and range restrictions on .operators, ..and it is .shown that the local 
operators which satisfy minimal normative and rationality conditions are few or non­
existent. 
*This paper was written during the first author's visit to the Division of the Humanities and Social
Sciences at the California Institute of Technology. Partial financial support was received from the Caltech 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. 
1 Aleskerov and Vladmirov (1986) show that these conditions are equivalent to Arrow's original con­
ditions. We use the former here only for rhetorical purposes. 
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In the classic framework, Wilson (1972) and subsequently Aleskerov and Vladmirov
(1986) replace monotonicity by the weaker condition of neutrality. They show that the
only social welfare functions satisfying non-imposedness, Independence of Irrelevant Al­
ternatives, and neutrality are dictatorial or inversely dictatorial: in particular, the only 
non-monotonic operators which satisfy these conditions are inversely dictatorial. In this 
paper, we extend the non-binary framework in Wilson's direction by completely charac­
terizing the class of local operators-including non-monotonic operators-and consider­
ing the operators satisfying various combinations of normative and rationality conditions 
in the absence of monotonicity. Surprisingly, the restriction of monotonicity is not bind­
ing for operators satisfying "most" rationality conditions. That is, "most" domain and 
range restrictions are met only by monotonic operators. We identify two classes of oper­
ators isolated by domain and range restrictions that do admit non-monotonic operators. 
One class is defined on a very small domain and contains every sovereign and neutral 
operator, and the other class is defined on an intermediate domain and contains only 
two types of operators: dictatorships and anti-dictatorships. This last result is a direct 
non-binary counterpart to Wilson's theorem. 
In Section 1, we introduce the non-binary framework in precise terms and outline the
important results preceding this paper. We characterize the class of local operators in 
Appendix A and derive the explicit forms of all neutral operators. In Section 2, we state 
our results for local operators satisfying sovereignty and neutrality (with and without 
anonymity). In Section 3,  we provide the explicit forms of local operators isolated by 
several rationality conditions in addition to sovereignty and neutrality (with and without 
anonymity) , with proofs in Appendix B and Appendix C. And in Section 4, our results 
are discussed and the paper is concluded. 
1 The Non-Binary Framework 
Let A be the finite universe of alternatives { x1 • . . •  , Xm} and let N be the finite population
of individuals {1, ... , n}, where m and 11 are both integers greater than one. Assume that
when presented with any admissibl<> subset X E A = 2A \ 0 each individual i chooses a
(possibly empty) set Ci(X) � X, wh<>re x E C.( X) is to be interpreted as a vote for x out
of X.2 The collection of pairs {(C;(X).X)}xE.A entails a choice function Ci: A--+ 2A,
and the space of all such choice fun ct.ions is denoted e with cross product en = x iENe.
The social choice function is determined by a functional voting operator F : en --+ C
which takes every functional profile c = {Ci} i=I E en of individual choice functions into
a social choice function F(C) EC. We will often write C for F(C), C' for F(C'), and
so on. Let V(x, X; C) = {i E Nl:r E Ci(X)} be the set of individuals who choose x out
2We will use the following convention for set inclusion: �denotes weak inclusion, while C is reserved
for strict inclusion. 
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of X. We restrict our analysis to operators which are local in the sense that the social
choice of x out of X depends only on the set of individuals who vote for x out of X: 
Definition i An operator F is local if for all profiles C and C'
[V(x, X; C) = V(x, X; C')] => [x E C(X) {:} x E C'(X)], 
for every admissible X and x E X. The class of local operators is denoted A. 
This is clearly a strong restriction, excluding from our analysis many common methods 
of aggregation such as plurality rule and Borda rule. 
There are several classes of local operators we will find particularly important: 
Definition 2 An operator FE A is
(Un) a federation operator if there exists a collection n = { w1, • • •  , w9} with q 2::: 1 and
0 C w � N for all w E n such that
C(X) = LJ n Ci(X);
wEl1iEw 
(nu) a representation operator if there exists a collection E = { t:1, ... , t:p} with p 2::: 1
and 0 C t: � N for all t: E E such that
C(X) = n LJ Ci(X);
£EE iE£ 
(n) an oligarchy operator 1f there exist8 0 Cw � N such that
C(X) = n Ci(X);
iEw 
(U) a syndicate operator if there exists 0 C t: � N such that
C(X) = LJ Ci(X);
iE£ 
( d) a dictatorship operator if there exists d E N such that
C(X) = Cd(X); 
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(t) a t-majority operator if 1 � t � n, M ={µ�Nit� lµI}, and 
C(X) = LJ n Ci(X),
µEMiEµ 
for all admissible X. These classes are denoted Aun, A nu, An, Au, Ad, and At, respec­
tively. · 
Clearly, t-majority is the special case of federation operator with n = {w � Nit � lwl};
oligarchy is the special case of federation with q = 1; syndicate is the special case of
representation with p = 1; and dictatorship is the special case of both oligarchy and 
syndicate with lwl = lt:I = 1.
Also define the particular operators unanimity and varanimity, respectively, by
iEN 
for all admissible X.3 Note that unanimity is the special case of oligarchy with w = N, 
and varanimity is the special case of syndicate with E = N. The following results are
straightforward consequences of the above definitions: 
Theorem 1 ( Aizerman and Aleskerov)
1 Au U An C Aun = A nu; 
2 AnnAu=Ad; 
3 NnAd=0; 
4 A1nAu= {Fv}; 
5 N n An = { pU}. 
These relationships are represented hy a Venn diagram in Figure 1. 
(Figure 1 about here.) 
We will explore the forms of local operators isolated by the following normative con­
ditions and their combinations: 
30ur exposition suffers for want of a widely accepted term for Fv. Aizerman and Aleskerov (1986)
refer to this as "one-vote-for." This is unwieldly, however, and the term "varanimity" has the advantage 
of etymological correctness. 
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Definition 3 An operator FE A satisfies
(S) sovereignty if for each admissible X and x E X, there is a profile C such that
x E C(X). Moreover, for each admissible X and x E X, there is a profile C such
that x </. C(X).
(M) monotonicity if for all profiles C and C' and every admissible X such that x E
C(X), 
[V(x, X; C) � V(x, X; C')] =} [x E C'(X)]. 
(N) neutrality if for all profiles C and C' and for all admissible X and X' with x E X
and x' EX',
[V(x, X; C) = V(x', X'; C')] =} [x E C(X) <=? x' E C'(X')].
(A) anonymity if for every permutation T/ on N, 
F( C) = F( { c'l(i)} ). 
(P) Pareto if for each admissible X, x E Ci(X) for every individual implies x E C(X). 
Conversely, if for every individual x <f. Ci(X) then x </. C(X).
These classes are denoted As, AM, AN, A A, and AP, respectively. 
We designate clases of operators satisfying combinations of these conditions by listing 
those conditions as superscripts: for example, A5N = A5 n AN. Note that monotonicity
and neutrality imply locality, itself a strong restriction as mentioned above. 
It is a simple matter to deduce the explicit forms of operators satisfying the first three 
and first four of these conditions: 
Theorem 2 (Aizerman and Aleskerov)
2 ASMNA = N. 
In addition to normative conditions, we are interested in isolating classes of opera.tors 
by rationality conditions in the form of domain and range restrictions: 
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Definition 4 The domain Qd � Qr � C is Qr-closed by F E A if for all profiles
CE XieNQd F(C) E Qr. Let AQd,Qr ={FE AIQd is Qr-closed by F}. 
When Qd = Qr = Q, we denote Aqd,Qr simply by Aq. The rationality conditions for
operators are derived from the rationality conditions for choice functions: 
Definition 5 A choice function C satisfies 
(H) heritage if 
(C) concordance if 
(0) outcast if 
(K) constancy if 
for all admissible X1 and X2•
[X1 � X2] and [C(X2) = 0 or X1 n C(X2) -::j:. 0]
=> [C(Xi) = C(X2) n Xi], 
Let (H) denote the condition of heritage, and let H C C denote the set of choice func­
tions that satisfy heritage. Likewise for (C), (0), and (K).4 It is known that all eight 
intersections of combinations of H, C, and 0 and their complements H, C, and 0 are
non-empty, while K C H n C n 0. Furthermore, a choice function satisfies (K) if and 
only if it maximizes an extended weak order;5 a choice function satisfies (H n C n 0) 
if and only if it picks the undominated elements of an extended strict partial order; a 
choice function satisfies (H n 0) if and only if it is path independent;6 and a choice
4The conditions (H) and (C) are called o and I by Sen (1970); (0) is somewhat stronger than Sen's
o; and (K) was.-originally.1ntr-0duced ·,hy Chern-Off ( 1954) and subsequently used ·by ATrow (1959). We
use the notation of Aizerman and Malishevski (1981). 
5 An extended binary relation partitions the universe A into A1 and A2, where the elements of A1 are
ordered by the binary relation and the elements of A2 are dominated by each other and by the elements
of A1. This allows for the possibility of empty choice. A non-empty choice function satisfies (K) if and
only if it maximizes a weak order in the usual sense. 
6These are the functions which satisfy Plott 's ( 1973) condition of path independence: if X = 
U.Pe-t X¢ = U¢e4> X.p then C(LJ.peljl C(X11. )) = C(LJ.pe4t C(X.p)). 
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I I AH I Ac I Ao I AHnC I 
1�::A1 
Aun 
I{��} I 
Au 
I{��} I A' {FP} 
I I AHnO I Acno I AHnCnO I AK I 
I �::A I{��} I 
A'fl 
I 
A'fl 
I 
A'fl 
I 0 0 0 
Table 1: Theorem 3 
function satisfies (H n C) if and only if it chooses the undominated elements of some 
binary relation. 7 
Operators from the class AH are rational in the sense that the social choice function
F( C) inherits the rationality of the individual choice functions Ci E H, and likewise
for Ao, AHnC, and so on. An example of a class of operators isolated by rationality
conditions are the social welfare functions: they are just AK. As Arrow first showed, the 
rationality conditions are extremely powerful in conjunction with the normative condi­
tions: 
Theorem 3 (Aizerman and Aleskerov) In Table 1, cells list the classes of operators 
satisfying the corresponding normative and rationality conditions. 
2 Non-Monotonic Operators: Normative Restric­
tions 
The contribution of Aizerman and Aleskerov ( 1986) is an exhaustive analysis of the class 
AM of local monotonic operators, yielding Theorems 2 and 3 as special cases of more
general theorems. Their results, however, leave untouched those local operators which 
fail monotonicity. In Appendix A, we characterize the class of local operators-including 
non-monotonic operators-and provide the explicit form of neutral operators satisfying 
sovereignty, anonymity, and their combinations. Here we present our results for the 
classes ASN and ASNA, with proofs provided in Appendix A. Theorems 4 and 5, below, 
are direct extensions of Theorems 1 and 2. 
7Note that these claims rely on our assumption that every pair of alternatives is an admissible set. 
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An example of a non-monotonic operator is that defined by C ( X) = Ci( X) n CT ( X), 
where for a choice function C we use c- to denote the complement of C: c-(X) = 
X \ C(X), for all admissible X . It does not follow, however, that an operator is non­
monotonic merely from the fact that it can be written as a union of intersections of choice 
functions with some "negative" terms: the operator defined by 
C(X) = [C1(X) n C2(X)] u [C}(X) n C2(X)] u [C1(X) n C2(X)] 
is actually monotonic since it can be rewritten as C(X) = C1(X)UC2(X). Larger classes 
of operators which contain non-monotonic operators are introduced next: 
Definition 6 An operator FE A is 
(U n ±) a generalized federation operator if there exists a collection n = { W1, . • .  , Wq} 
with 0 < q < 2n such that 
C(X) = LJ n Ci(X), 
wEO iEN 
where 
( n U ±) a generalized representation operator if there exists a collection E = { t1, . . •  , tp}
with 0 < p < 2n such that 
C'(X) = n LJ Ci( X), 
(EE iEN 
where 
{ n-) an anti-oligarchy opera! or 1f I here exists 0 C w* � N such that
C'(X) = n ci-(X); 
iEw• 
{u-) an anti-syndicate operator if there exists 0 C t* � N such that
C(X) = LJ ci-(X);iE(• 
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(d-) an anti-dictatorship operator if there exists d E N such that
C(X) = Ci(X);
(T±) a T-majority operator if T is a non-empty set of integers between zero and n with 
T:f- {O, . . .  , n}, M ={µ�NI lµI ET}, and
where 
C(X) = LJ n Ct(X), 
µEMiEN 
if i E µ 
else. 
These classes are denoted Aun±, A nu±, An-, Au-, Ad-, and AT±, respectively.
It follows that T-majority is the special case of generalized federation with n = {w � 
NI lwl ET}; an anti-oligarchy is the special case of generalized federation with n = {w � 
Nlw* n w = 0}; an anti-syndicate is the special case of generalized representation with
E = { E � Nit:* n E = 0}; and anti-dictatorship is the special case of both anti-oligarchy
and anti-syndicate with lwl = lt:I = 1 .
As an example of a generalized T-majority operator, let n = 5 and T = {3, 5}. Then
an alternative x is socially chosen from an admissible X whenever exactly 3 or exactly 5
individuals vote for x-but if 1 ,  2, or 4 voters choose x. then it is socially rejected. 
Also define the non-monotonic counterparts of unanimity and varanimity by 
Fu-(C) 
F\'-(6) 
iEN 
for all admissible X. We call Fu- negative unanimity since an alternative xis chosen from
X if and only if it is chosen by no individual, and pv- is called negative varanimity since 
an alternative x is chosen from X if and only if jt .is rejected by .at least .one individual.
Negative unanimity is the special case of generalized federation and anti-oligarchy when 
n = {0} and it is the special case of T-majority when T = {O}. Negative varanimity is
the special case of generalized representation and anti-syndicate when E = {0} and it is
the special case of T-majority when T = {O, . .. ,n - l}.
The next theorem extends Theorem 1 to the case of non-monotonic operators, reveal­
ing the structure of the class of generalized federation operators: 
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Theorem 4 
1 Aun U Au- U An- U AT± C Aun±= Anu±;
2 Au-n An-= Ad-;
3 An-nAun=Au-nAun=AT±nAd-=0;
4 At c AT±; 
5 AT± n Au-= {Fv-}; 
6 AT± n An- = {Fu-}; 
7 AT± n Aun = At. 
These relationships are represented by a Venn diagram in Figure 2. 
(Figure 2 about here.) 
We now extend Theorem 2 to the non-monotonic case. Together with Theorem 4, this 
provides the explicit form of all non-monotonic local operators isolated by sovereignty 
and neutrality: 
Theorem 5 
1 ASN = Aun± = Anu±;
3 Non-Monotonic Operators: Rationality Restric­
tions 
In this section, we consider the classes of local operators isolated by various rational­
ity conditions combined with sovereignty and neutrality, with and without anonymity. 
Theorems 7 and 10 concern the properties of choice functions only and are proved in 
Appendix C, while the other theorems in this section concern local operators and are 
proved in Appendix B. The first result is immediate, and extends Theorem 3 by adding
two more rows to Table 1: 
10 
I I AH I Ac I Ao I AHnC I 
I �::A I 
Aun 
I{��} I 
Au 
I {��} I N {Fv} 
I I AHnO I Acno I AHnCnO I AK I 
I ��:A I {��} I 
Ad 
I 
Ad 
I 
Ad 
I 0 0 0 
Table 2: Theorem 6 
Theorem 6 In Table 2, cells list the classes of operators satisfying the corresponding 
normative and rationality conditions. 
Note that this is just the table of Theorem 3 with the rows appropriately relabeled!
In other words, there are no non-monotonic operators which close these important do­
mains. This is in stark contrast to the classic framework, in which Wilson ( 1972) and 
subsequently Aleskerov and Vladmirov (1986) show that the only non-dictatorial social 
welfare function satisfying appropriate formulations of locality, sovereignty, and neutral­
ity are inversely dictatorial. This difference is partly accounted for by an attribute of 
operators in the classic framework which is not shared by operators in the non-binary 
framework: the inverse of a weak order is a weak order, but the complement of a choice 
function satisfying (K) does not necessarily satisfy (K). 
Are there any interesting domains which are closed by non-monotonic operators? We 
next introduce several additional rationality conditions for operators in an attempt to 
answer this question. For a class Q � C, let Q- = { C E cic- E Q}. That is, Q- is
the set of choice functions which are tlw rnmplements of choice functions in Q. We then 
have the following result: 
Theorem 7 The explicit forms of !hr conditions H-, c-, o-, and K- are
(H-) [X1 � X2]:::} [C(Xi) � C(X2)];
(C-) [Y � X1 n X2 and C(Xi) n Y = C(X2) n Y = 0]
:::} [C(X1 U X2) n Y = 0]; 
(O-) [X1 � C(X2)] :::} [C(X2 \ X1) = C(X2) \Xi];
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I AH- I Ac- Ao-
I ��:A 
Aun 
I 
Au An 
A' {Fv} {FD} 
I AH-nO- I Ac-no- I AH-nC-nO-
1�:A 
An 
I 
Aa 
I 
Aa 
{FD} 0 0 
Table 3: Theorem 8 
(K-) [X1 � X2] and [X1 !l C(X2) or C(X2) = X2]
::::} [C(X1) = C(X2) n X1], 
J or all admissible X 1, X 2, and Y. 
AH-nC-
Au 
{Fv} 
AK-
Aa 
0 
Note that H- is the domain of all monotonic choice functions, in the sense that if one set 
of alternatives is contained within another then the respective choice sets are in the same 
relation. For a choice function satisfying (C-) , if an element is rejected from two sets of 
alternatives then it is rejected from their union. For a choice function satisfying (O-), 
a subset of chosen alternatives may be deleted without disturbing the choice set in any 
other way. Lastly, a choice function satisfying (K-) behaves much like one satisfying (K), 
but it exhibits the peculiar property that the alternatives chosen from an admissible set 
are not necessarily chosen from the smaller admissible set consisting of just the originally 
chosen alternatives. 
The classes of operators which close these new domains are investigated next: 
Theorem 8 In Table 3, cells /isl lhf' clasSf's of operators satisfying the corresponding 
normative and rationality conditions. 
Once again none of the eight domains is closed with respect to a non-monotonic operator. 
One domain which is closed relative the entire class of generalized federation operators 
is defined next: 
Definition 7 A choice function C satisfies 
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(K*) strong constancy if there exists A* � A such that
C(X) = A* nx, 
for all admissible X. 
Choice over all admissible sets according to (K*) is entirely given by the choice A* from 
the universe A. If X is the set of alternatives then the alternatives chosen from X are 
just the elements of A*, and it follows that when X n A* = 0 the choice out of X
is empty. These choice functions are extremely rational, and it is easy to check that 
K* � H n H- n C n c- n 0 n o-. This yields the following theorem:
Although none of the sixteen domains considered in Theorems 6 and 8 is closed with 
respect to a non-monotonic operator, there are many other combinations which might 
be. Of particular interest are H n H-, 0 no-, and C n c-. The first two of these 
domains and their relationship to K* is the subject of the next theorem and corollary: 
Theorem 10 H n H- = 0 n o- = K*. 
Corollary 1 1  AHnH- n ASN = Aono- n ASN = Aun±.
We have then shown that there are no sovereign and neutral non-monotonic operators 
which close the usual domains, and that there is one extremely rational domain closed by 
every sovereign and neutral operator-non-monotonic as well as monotonic. The domain 
C n c- is more interesting, as it does not demand the extreme rationality of K*: for 
example, consider a choice function C such that C( {x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}, C( {x, y}) = {x }, 
C({y,z}) = {y}, and C({x,z}) = {z}. This choice function satisfies (C) and (C-), but 
obviously violates (H). Nevertheless. this domain is closed by exactly one monotonic 
operator and exactly one non-monotonic operator: 
This is a direct non-binary counterpart to Wilson's theorem. 
There are 63 non-empty domains isolated by combinations of the rationality condi­
tions (H), (C), (0), (H-), (C-), and (O-). Of these, 14 are covered by Theorems 6 and
13 
8, and 28 reduce to the domain K* and are covered by Theorem 9. One more is treated
in Theorem 13, leaving 20 domains which may be closed by a non-monotonic operator.
Moreover, we have not considered the classes of operators which close domains which are 
strictly smaller than their ranges, such as AHnC,H· It is possible to show, however, that
of all these possibilities C n c- is the only domain other than K* which is closed by a 
non-monotonic operator. 
4 Conclusion 
We extend the non-binary framework of Aizerman and Aleskerov (1986) by completely
characterizing the class of local operators-monotonic and non-monotonic-and consider­
ing the operators satisfying various normative and rationality conditions in the absence 
of monotonicity. The explicit forms of all neutral operators are derived in Appendix 
A, and these results are presented in Theorems 4 and 5 with the additional condition 
of sovereignty (with and without anyonymity) . We also provide the explicit forms of
sovereign and neutral operators which satisfy a range of rationality conditions. 
This was done by Wilson (1972) in the classic framework, in which monotonicity is a 
binding constraint: when it is relaxed dictatorship and inverse dictatorship both satisfy 
the remaining conditions. In the non-binary framework, however, we find that mono­
tonicity in conjunction with sovereignty, neutrality, and the usual rationality conditions 
is not binding. A more thorough investigation reveals that all sovereign and neutral 
operators-monotonic and non-monotonic-close the extremely rational domain K*, so 
that monotonicity is binding for such operators. Moreover, Wilson's theorem carries over 
to the non-binary framework in an extremely interesti'ng way: there is one and only one 
domain c n c- closed by just dictatorship and anti-dictatorship operators. 
A Proofs of Theorems: Normative Restrictions 
Define for every individual i the boolC'an variable 
li(x, X) = { 1 if x E Ci(X)0 else. 
The locality of an operator Fis then equivalent to the existence of a boolean function J( x, X; n x, X)) 
such that 
!( "" · /-( 
' " ))
-
{ 1 if x E C(X) x' ·"' ' x, ·"' - 0 I e se. 
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The main theorem of boolean logic shows that the function f can be written explicitly in 
disjunctive normal form as8 
f(x,X;/(x,X)) = YweO(x,X) /\ieN li(x,X),
where U(x, X) = {w�x,X), ... , w!(;J)} is a collection of q(x, X) sets of individuals varying with
x and X, and 
l�(x X) =
{ li(x,X) if i E w
1 ' lli(x, X)- ll else.
Alternatively, according to the theorem, f can be written explicitly in conjunctive normal form 
as 
f(x, X; /(x, X)) = /\!EE(x,X) VieN li(x, X), 
where E( x, X) = { €ix,X), . . . , €�(:.t )} and l[ is defined in the same fashion as 1r.
It is easy to see that x E C(X) for all profiles when fl(x, X) = 2N. Not so obvious is the fact
that for all profiles x � C(X) when E(x,X) = 2N. To see this, suppose x E C(X), construct
€ from N by excluding the individuals who choose x and including the individuals who reject
x. By assumption, € E E(x, X). But since x E C(X), there must be either a member of€ who
chooses x or a non-member who rejects x, contradicting the construction oft. We adopt the 
conventions that summation over the empty set yields a value of zero and that multiplication 
over the empty set yields a value of one, so that for all profiles x � C(X) when fl(x, X) = 0 
and x E C(X) when E(x, X) = 0. Define the two trivial operators F0 and F1 by
F0(C)(X) 0 
F1 (C)(X) X, 
for all admissible X. It then follows that F = F0 when for all admissible X and x E X we
have fl(x,X) = 0 or E(x,X) = 2N, and F = F1 when for all admissible X and x EX we have
n(x,X) = 2N or E(x,X) = 0.
The collection {n(x,X)}xe.A,.rEX is thf' disjunctiPe list for F, and it is a routine matter to
check that for every profile it satisfies 
[x E C(X)] ¢:> [\'(x.X;C) E n(x,X)],
for all admissible X. The collection { £( x, X)} x E.A,.rEX is the conjunctive list for F, which for
every profile-satisfies 
[x � C(X)] ¢:> [N \ V(x, X; C) E E(x, X)], 
for all admissible X. To see this, assume x � C(X), so that there is some€ E E(x,X) such that
all members off reject x and all non-members choose x. But then we have€= N\ V(x, X; C) E 
E(x,X). Now assume N \ F(x,X;C) E E(x,X) and suppose that x E C(X). Then for every 
8V and /\ are boolean addition and multiplication, respectively, defined by [j V lj = 1 if h + lj � 1
and /j V lj = 0 otherwise, and /; /\ lj = 1 if/; + lj = 2 and /; /\ lj = 0 otherwise.
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f. E E(x,X) there is either a member who chooses x or a non-member who rejects x, and in
particular, this must be true for N \ V(x,X; C). This is, of course, a contradiction.
Since federation operators are monotonic, we can refine their disjunctive lists by omitting 
the listed w's which strictly contain another listed w. For example, the oligarchy operator given 
by C(X) = fUew• Ci(X) for all admissible X need not be described by the list 0 = {w �
Nlw* � w}. Rather, the specification of w* itself is sufficient. For F E  Aun with disunctive list
n, define 
08 = {w E Olw' rt. w for all w' E O}.
We call 08 the basic list for F, and naturally, we can similarly define basic lists E8 for repre­
sentation operators. 
The above analysis characterizes the class A of local operators in terms of boolean functions 
and in terms of lists. By reformulating the normative conditions in these terms, we character­
ize the classes of local operators satisfying them separately and in combination. In terms of 
disjunctive lists, sovereignty, monotonicity, neutrality, anonymity, and Pareto are 
(Mw) if w E O(x, X) and w � w' then w' E O(x, X);
(Nw) O(x, X) = O(x', X') for all X' and x' E X';
(Aw) if w E O(x, X) and lwl = lw'I then w' E O(x, X);
(Pw) N E  O(x,X) and 0 � O(x,X);
for all admissible X and x E X. Similar reformulatio.ns are possible in terms of boolean 
functions and conjunctive lists. 
A sharper characterization is possible for the neutral classes AN , A8N , AAN , and ASNA.
Neutrality is equivalent to the requir<>ment that O(x, X) is independent of both x and X, so 
that the disjunctive list for a neutral OpPrator is simply n. Define the replenished classes of 
operators: 
j\un± 
j\nu± = 
fi..T± 
,\ un± U { Fo, Fl}
Anu± U {Fo, Fl}
AT±u{F0,F1}. 
That is, we replenish Aun± by allowing q = 0 and q = 2" in Definition 6 ,  so that F E Aun± if
there exists a collection n = {w1, ... ,wq} with 0 :s; q :s; 2" such that C(X) = UwennieNcr(x).
Similarly, we replenish A nu± by allowing p = 0 and p = 2", and we replenish AT± by allowing
T = 0 and T = N U {O}. 
We then have the following general results: 
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Theorem A.1 AN= A_un± = A_nu±.
Proof: Consider an operator FE AN. We will show that FE A_un±. We know from the above
reformulation of neutrality in terms of boolean functions that F can be represented by a function 
f(i(x, X)) = VweoAieN'r(x, X), and we will show that F(C)(X) = C(X) = Uweo nieN C'f(X) 
for every profile C and admissible X. 
Assume that x E C(X) for some profile C and admissible X . .  Then there is an w E n
such that V(x, X; C) = w. Then x E Ci(X) for all i E w and x E Cj(X) for all j ¢ w,  so
x E nieN cr(x) � Uweo neN Cf(X). Now assume that x E UweO neN Ci(X) for some 
profile C and admissible X. Then there is w E fl such that x E nieNCi'(X), so x E Ci(X) for
all i E w and x E cj-(X) for all j ¢ w. That is, V(x, X; C) = w E n ,  so x E C(X). Therefore, 
the desired equality holds and F E Aun±.
The proof that F E  A_nu± is similar, using the conjunctive list for F. It is obvious that op­
erators in replenished classes of generalized federation and generalized representation operators 
satisfy neutrality, giving us the desired equalities. D 
Theorem A.2 ANA= J\T±.
Proof: From Theorem A . 1, we know that F E ANA satisfies C(X) = Uwen nieN Cf'(X) for 
some collection n.  By (Aw), we know that if w E n and lwl = lw'I then w' E n. Now set 
T = {lwl lw E n} and note that F E  fi.T±. It is obvious that operators in the replenished class 
of T-majority operators satisfy neutrality and anonymity, giving us the desired equality. D 
Having characterized AN and AN A, we next derive Theorem 5, and once that is done the 
proof of Theorem 4 is straightforward: 
Theorem 5 
1 ASN =Aun±= Anu±;
2 ASNA =AT±. 
Proof: (1) Consider an operator F E  A5N. From Theorem A.1, we know that F E  Aun±,
and by sovereignty it cannot be the case that n = 0 or n = 2N. Then n = {wi , . .  ·. , wq}
with 0 < q < 2n, and F E Aun±. It is obvious that generalized federation operators satisfy 
sovereignty and neutrality. The proof that A SN = A nu± is similar. 
(2) Consider an operator F E ASNA. From Theorem A.2, we know that F E  }.T±, and 
by sovereignty it cannot be the case that T = 0 or T = {O, . . .  , n}. But then F E AT±. It is 
obvious that T-majority operators satisfy sovereignty, neutrality, and anonymity. D 
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Theorem 4 
1 Aun U Au- U An- U AT± C Aun±= Anu±; 
2 Au-n An- = Ad-; 
3 An-nAuri::Au-nAun=AT±nAd-=0; 
4 At c AT±; 
5 AT± n Au-= {Fv-}; 
6 AT± n An-= {Fu-}; 
7 AT± n Aun = At. 
Proof: (1) It is shown in Theorem A . 1  that Aun± = Anu±. We know that T-majority, anti­
oligarchy, and anti-syndicate are special cases of generalized federation and generalized repre­
sentation, so we must show that Aun � Aun±. Consider F E Aun with disjunctive list n and 
construct S11 from S1 by S1' = { w' � N lw � w' for some w E S1}. Then for every profile C we 
have C(X) = Uw'En'niENCi(X) for all admissible X and 0 < IS11 < 2n, so that F E  Aun±.
To see that the inclusion is strict, consider the operator defined by C(X) = C1(X) n C:2(X)
for all admissible X.
(2) Consider an operator F E An-n Au-. Since F is an anti-syndicate operator, there is an 
individual i who can secure the social choice of every alternative x from every admissible X by 
rejecting it .  And since Fis an anti-oligarchy operator, there is an w � N such that any member 
of w can ensure that an alternative x is socially rejected from an admissible X by choosing it. 
It must be that {i} = w. But then i is an anti-dictator and FE Ad-. The opposite inclusion 
is obvious, giving us the desired equality. 
(3) It is clear that An- n Aun = 0, since anti-syndicate operators are non-monotonic and
federation operators are monotonic. Similarly, we have Au-nAun = 0. To see that AT±nAd- =
0, suppose a T-majority operator is an ant i-dictator operator. Then it must be that T = {1}, 
but then every voter would be an ant i-dictator. This is, of course, impossible. 
(4) For F E  A1, set T = {t,. . .,11} and M = {µ � NllµI E T}, and note that for every 
profile C we have C(X) = LJµEAfnieNCf(X) for all admissible X, so that F E  AT. To see
that the inclusion.ls strict,.consider the example-of T-majority in Section 2. 
(5) Consider FE AT± n Au-. Since Fis an anti-syndicate operator, there is an f. such that
every member off. can secure the social choice of x out of each admissible X by rejecting it .  
Then i t  must be that T = {O, . . . , n - 1} ,  but then every voter can ensure the social choice of x 
from X by rejecting it .  Therefore, F = pv-. The opposite inclusion is obvious, giving us the 
desired equality. 
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( 6) Consider F E AT± n An-. Since F is an anti-oligarchy operator, there is an w � N such
that x is chosen out of each admissible X if and only if w � N \ V( x, X; C). Then it must be
that T = {O, . . .  , n - lwl}. Now if lwl < n then we can find i E w and j � w, and construct w' 
by replacing i with j, so that lwl = lw'I· Since FE AT± it follows that x is chosen out of X if 
w' = N \ V(x;X; C), but this is impossible because i E w n V(x, X; C). Therefore, lwl = n and
T = {O}. That is, F = pu-. The opposite inclusion is obvious, giving us the desired equality.
(1) Note that any operator F E AT± n Aun must be monotonic, so T must be the set of all 
integers between some t and n. Therefore, F E At. The opposite inclusion is obvious, giving us 
the desired equality. D 
B Proofs of Theorems: Rationality Restrictions 
Now that we have characterized the classes of local operators satisfying various normative 
restrictions, we turn to those classes isolated by rationality restrictions in conjunction with 
sovereignty and neutrality. Aizerman and Aleskerov (1986) provide a characterization in terms 
of disjunctive lists for the classes of operators that close the domains H, C, and 0, which we 
provide here for the special case of neutral operators: 
(Hw) [w E f! and w � w'J::::} [w' E f!J;
(Cw) [w1 En, W2 E n, and W1 n W2 � w]::::} [w E f!];
(Ow) [w1 E f!, W2 � f!, and W1 \ W2 � W � W1 U w2]::::} [w E f!j,
and [w2 � f!, W3 � f!, and W3 \ W2 � W � W3 LJ W2] ::::} [w � f!j.
Moreover, these conditions carry over to two intersections of these domains: 
Attno 
Acno 
AttnA0 
Ac n A0. 
That is, FE AttnO if and only if it satisfies both conditions (Hw) and (Ow), and similarly for 
Acno·
These results and the following lemma allow us to _prove .Theorem 6: 
Proof: Consider FE AQ2,Q and a profile CE XiENQ1. Then since CE XiENQ2 it immediately
follows that F(C) E Q and F E AQ1,Q· Now consider FE AQ,Qi and a profile CE XiENQ. 
Then F(C) E Qi � Q2, and it follows that FE AQ,Q2• D 
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Theorem 6 In Table 1, cells list the classes of operators satisfying the corresponding normative 
and rationality conditions. 
Proof: The proof follows for columns Aa, Ac, Ao, Aano, and Acno by noting that conditions(Hw) and (Cwi) obviously imply the reformulation (Mw) of monotonicity in terms of disjunctive
lists, so all of these classes are contained in AM. That (Owi) also implies monotonicity can be
seen by considering an operator FE Ao with w' � 0. Setting w2 = W3 = w' in (Ow), it follows
that [0 � w � w'] => [w � 0), which is equivalent to (Mw)· 
Columns Aanc, Aancno, and AK require a little more work. Since K � HnC � Hncno� 
the c:lesired resiilt will follow from Lemma B.1 if we can show that AK,H � AM. To this end,
consider an operator FE AK,Hnc, assume that w E n, and w � w', and suppose that w' <I. 0.Now construct the following  profile for admissible X1 � X2 and x E X1: 
i E N \ w' => x </. Ci(X1) U Ci(X2), 
i E w' \ w => x E Ci(X1), Ci(X2) � X2 \Xi, 
i E w => x E Ci(Xi) n C;(X2),
and note that Ci is consistent with K for every individual, so we can assume C E X ieNK .
Furthermore, V(x, X1; C) = w' rt. n and V(x, X2; C) = w E n. Then x E C(X2) and x <t. C(X1), 
violating (H). Therefore, w' E n and F is monotonic. o 
Theorem 8 is an easy consequence of Theorem 6 and th.e next two lemmas, in which C1 
denotes the choice function C(X) = X for all admissible X and c0 denotes the choice function 
C(X) = 0 for all admissible X: 
Lemma B.2 For all Q � C, An� AQ if and only if Au� AQ-·
Proof: We prove only the "only if" direction. as the "if" direction follows by a similar argument . 
Assume that An� AQ and consider the operator F E Au, so there is w � N such that for 
all profiles C we have C(X) = UiewC.(X). for all admissible X. Pick a profile CE XieNQ-, 
relabel indexes so that w = { 1, . . .  , lwl}. and for each k E w define the choice function C( .; k) by 
C(X;k) = Uf=1 Ci(X) for all admissible X. C(.; 1) = C1 E Q- follows immediately, so assume
that C(.;k) E Q-. Note that C(.;k+ I) is defined by C(X; k+ 1 ) = C(X;k)UCk+1(X) for all
admissible X. We.Jmow the.operator defined by c-(X;k + l} = c-(X;-k) n Ck"+1(X) belongs
to Q since c-(.;k),Ck+1 E Q and An� AQ. But then C(.;k+ 1) E Q-, and by induction we
have C = C( .; lwl) E Q-. A similar argument proves the other direction. D
Lemma B .3 For all Q � C such that C1, c0 E Q,
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2 [An c Aq n Aun]=> [Aun� Aq]
8 [AU c Aq n A Un]=> [Aun� AQ]·
Proof: (1) In words, we must show that if the dictatorship operators are strictly contained in the 
class of federation operators which close Q, then Q is either closed with respect to intersection 
or union. Consider F E ( AQ n Aun) \ Ad. We know that there is a basic list 08 such that
for every profile c we have C( X) = UweOB niew Ci( X) for all admissible x. Since F is not a
dictatorship, we know that either j08j > 1 or QB = {w} with jwj > 1 .  
Assume the first case holds and define ni = {w E 08ji E w} for every individual. We  need 
two individuais i and j such that n i � n j and n j � nj. If such a pair does not exist then for
all pairs {i,j} � N either O; � Qi or ni � n i, so we can order N according to set inclusion of
the O;'s. Denote the set of maximal individuals by N*, and note that N* E 08 and N* � w 
for all w E 08. That is, 08 = {N*} and C(X) = nieN• Ci(X). Since F is not a dictatorship 
we know that I N *I > 1, so C(X) is the intersection of several choice functions from Q, and 
it follows that An � AQ. To see this, suppose there are C', C" E Q such that C ¢ Q, where 
C(X) = C'(X) n C"(X) for all admissible X. Pick i EN* and consider the profile CE XieNQ
in which Ci= C' and Cj = C" for j f:. i. Then C = C ¢ Q, contradicting the assumption that
FE AQ. 
So assume such a pair { i*, j*} does exist and consider w;• E 08 such that i* E Wj• and 
j* ¢ w;• along with Wj• E n8 such that j* E Wj• and i* ¢ Wj•. We will show that without loss 
of generality we can assume there is no w E 08 such that w � (wi• UWj•) \ {i*,j*}. To see this, 
suppose there is such an w. Since n8 is a basic list, we know that w n Wj• f:. 0 and w n Wj• f:. 0.
Pick an individual j E w n Wj• and relabel j as j* and w as Wj•, and note that the new pair
{i*,j*} satisfies O;· �Qi. and ni. C/: n i .. This process will eventually terminate at a pair with
the desired property. 
· 
Then consider the profile C E  x ieNQ in which C• and Cj• are arbitrary elements of Q, C; = 
C1 for all other i E Wj• UWj•, and Ci= c0 for all i � Wj• UWj•· Then C(X) = C;·(X)UCj·(X)
for all admissible X, since new,• Ci(X) = C,·(X), niew1• Ci(X) = Cj•(X), and
if w rt w·. U w··· ;,= t ) ' 
if i" E w � (wi• UWj•) \ {j*};
if j" E W � (Wi• UWj•) \ {i*};
if { i",j*} � W � Wj• UWj•,
where we have dismissed -wlthout loss of generality the case w � (w;• UWj•) \ {i* , j*}. Since 
F E AQ we know C E Q, and it follows by an induction argument that Au � AQ· 
If the first case does not hold then 08 = { w}, where lwl > 1 .  Then F is just an oligarchy
and it follows that An � AQ. 
(2) Consider F E (AQ n Aun)\ An. We know that there is a basic list n8 such that for 
every profile c we have C(X) = UweOB niewC;(X) for all admissible x. Since F is not an
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oligarchy, we know that lflBI > 1 ,  which is just the first case in the proof of (1). Again, we 
need two individuals i and j such that ni � fl; and n; � nj. If such a pair does not exist then
we know from the above argument that F is an oligarchy with QB= {N*}, a contradiction. It 
follows that we can find such a pair, and by the above argument we have Au� AQ. Since Q is 
closed with respect to union and intersection, it follows that Aun � Aq. 
( 3) Consider F E ( Aq n Aun) \ Au. We know that there is a basic list QB such that for all 
profiles C(X) =:= Uw OB new Ci(X) for all admissible x. Since F is not a syndicate, we know 
that there is w' E n� with lw'I > 1 ,  and since QB is a basic list we know that there does not
exist an w E 08 with w Cw'.
Now consider the profile C E XieNQ in which Ci E Q is arbitrary for every i E w' and 
C; = c0 for every j � w'. Then C(X) = niew' Ci(X) for all admissible X, and since F E  AQ 
we have C E Q. It follows by an induction argument that An � AQ. Since Q is closed with 
respect to union and intersection, it follows that Aun � AQ. D
Theorem 8 In Table 3, cells list the classes of opemtors satisfying the corresponding normative 
and mtionality conditions. 
Proof: The A SN row follows from the application of Theorem 6 ,  Lemma B.2., and Lemma B.3, 
while the A SN A row then follows by application of the definition of anonymity. As an example, 
consider the cell ASN n Ac-· By Theorem 6, An � Ac, so it follows from Lemma B.2 that
Au � Ac-n Aun. Now suppose this inclusion is strict, so that Au c Ac- n Aun. Then by
Lemma B.3 we have Aun� Ac-, and in particular, An� Ac-· But then Lemma B.2 implies 
that Au � Ac, contradicting Theorem 6. Therefore, Au = Ac- n Aun = Ac- n A SN. The
results for the other cells follow by similar arguments . D 
The proof of Theorem 9 is quick work: 
Theorem 9 AK• n ASN =Aun±.
Proof: It suffices to show that K* is closed with respect to union, intersection, and comple­
mentation. Consider C1 , C2 E K* given by A j and Ai, respectively, and consider the choice
function C defined by C(X) = Ci(X)nC'2(X) for all admissible X. Since x E C(X) if and only 
if x E A* = Ai n A;, it follows immediately that C' E K*. Similarly, the choice function C de­
fined by C1(X)U C2(X) for all admissible X satisfies x E C(X) if and only if x E A* = Ai U A2,
so C E  K*. Lastly, C = C} E K·, since x E C( X )  if and only if x E A \  Ai. o 
Theorem 12 is proved in a series of steps, in which we derive the explicit forms of operators 
in the classes Acnc-.c and Acnc-.c- and offer two corollaries of independent interest. In
what follows, an interval is a collection of subsets of N such as [w',w"] = {w � Nlw' � w � w"}.
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Theorem B�l F E  Acnc-,c n A5N if and only if 0 'f; {2N} ,  0 'f; {0} , and for all w',w" E 0
[w' n w" � w � w' U w") => [w E 0) .
Proof: We first prove the "only if" direction. Consider F E Acnc-,c n A SN, so F has a
disjunctive list 0. It follows from sovereignty that 0 'f; {2N} and 0 'f; {0} . Suppose there are 
w',w" E 0 and w � N such that w' n w" � w � w' U w" but w ¢ 0. For x E X1 n X2 both
admissible, construct the following profile C: 
i E N \ ( w' U w") => x ¢ Ci(Xi ) x ¢ Ci(X2) x ¢ Ci(X1 U X2 )
i E w' \ w => x E Ci(X1) x ¢ Ci(X2) x ¢ Ci(X1 U X2) 
i E w" \ w => x ¢ Ci(X1 ) x E Ci(X2) x ¢ Ci(X1 U X2) 
i E w \ w' => x ¢ Ci(X1 ) x E C(X2 )  x E Ci(X1 U X2) 
i E w \ w" ::} x E Ci(X1 ) x ¢ Ci(X2) x E Ci(X1 U X2) 
i E w' n w" ::} x E Ci(X1 ) x E Ci(X2) x E Ci(X1 U X2) .  
Note that this profile i s  consistent with C and c- , so we can assume C E XieNC n c-.  Now,
since V(x, X1 ; C) = w' E n we have x E C(X1 ), and since V(x, X2; C) = w" E n we have 
x E C(X2) .  But V(x, Xi U X2 ; C) = w, so x ¢ C(X1 U X2) and C ¢ C .  This, of course, 
contradicts the assumption that F E Acne- ,c n A SN • 
. We next prove the "if " direction . Consider an operator F with disjunctive list 0 satisfying 
the above condition and a profile C E X ieNC n c- . Assume x E C(X1 ) n C(X2) for arbitrary
admissible X1 and X2• Since x E C(Xi ) we know V(x, X1 ; C) E n, and since x E C(X2) we 
know V(x, X2 ; C) E n .  The desired result will follow if it can be shown that 
for then the above list condition implies that V( x, x, u X2 ; C) E n  and x E C(X1 u X2) .  Now,
consider i E V(x, X1 ; C) n V(x , X2; C ) .  wh ich implies x E Ci(X1 ) n Ci(X2 ) .  Since Ci E C,
it follows that x E Ci(X1 U X2 )  and i E l ' ( x ,  X1 U X2 ; C) ,  giving us one inclusion. Consider
i E V(x, X1 U X2; C) and suppose i � l '{ x  . .  \"1 ; C) U V(x,X2 ; C) .  Then x ¢ Ci(X1 ) and
x ¢ Ci(X2) ,  and it follows from Theorem i and  C E c- that x ¢ Ci(X1 U X2 ).  In other words,
i ¢ V( x, X1 U X2 ; C), a contradic t ion . Th is gi ves us the second inclusion and the desired result. 
D 
Lemma B .4 F E  Acnc- ,c n A 
SN if and only if there is an inter val [w', w'1 'f; {2N} [w', w"] 'f;
{0} such th at fo r a11 profiles, 
C(X )  = LJ n Ci(X) ,
wE[u.1',w"] iEN 
fo r all admissible X .  
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Proof: First the "only if" direction. Since F E A SN = Aun±, we know from Theorem 5
that there is a collection n such that for all profiles C(X) = Uwen neN Ci(X).  And since
FE Acnc-,c, it follows from Theorem B.1 that n is an interval [w', w'1· To see this, note that 
Theorem B.1 implies f1wen w E n and Uwen w E n. Then another application of Theorem B.1
implies [nn w, Un w] � n. Equality then follows since n � [no w, Un w]. Since F is sovereign, 
it must be that [w', w'1 1 {2N} and [w', w"] 1 {0}.
The "if" direction follows easily by noting that any operator with an interval disjunctive 
list is neutral and is also sovereign if the interval is not {0} and not {2N} .  Furthermore, such 
an operator closes C n c- since it satisfies the condition of Theorem B.1 .  D
In words, Lemma B . 4  establishes that there is an interval [w', w'1 such that an alternative x is 
chosen from each admissible X if and only if, for at least one group in the interval , all members 
choose x from X and all non-members reject x from X.
Lemma B.5 F E Acnc-,c- n A8N if and only if th ere is an interval [wi , w2] 1 {2N} and 
[w1 , w2] 1 {0} such th at for all profiles, 
wh ere 
for all admissible X. 
C(X) = n LJ c;w(X),
wE[w1 ,w2) iEN
c-:-w(X) = { ci-(X) if i E w;1 Ci(X) else, 
Proof: We know that F E Acnc- .c- n A8N if and only if F E  A8N and F(C) = C E c­
for all profiles C E X ieN C n c- . This is true if and only if F E A SN and for all profilesC E X ieNC n c- we have c- E C,  which by Lemma B.4 is true if and only if there exists an
interval [w', w'1 1 {2N } and [w', w"] 1 {0} such that for all profiles 
c - p : ) = LJ n Ci(X), 
wE(w1,w11] iEN
for all admissible X. By DeMorgan 's Law, this .is tr-0e if .and -only .jf -there exists an interval 
[w',w'1 1 {2N } and [w' , w'1 1 { 0} such that for all profiles 
C(X ) = n LJ Ciw (X ) ,
wE (w1,w11] iEN
for all admissible X. The desired result follows by setting [w1 , w2] = [w', w'1 - D
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In words, Lemma B .5 establishes that there is an interval (w1 , w2] such that an alternative x is
rejected from an admissible X if and only if, for at least one group in the interval, all members 
choose x from X and all non-members reject x from X. 
These results allow us to prove two interesting corollaries, and after the proof of an additional 
lemma we can prove Theorem 13 as well: 
Corollary B.2 An U An- C AcnC- ,C ·
Proof: Note that an oligarchy operator F is given by a disjunctive list 11 = { w  � N lw* � w }  with
0 C w* �  N.  This is just the interval [w* ,  NJ, and by Lemma B .4 it follows that F E  Acnc-,C · 
We know that an anti-oligarchy operator F is given by a disjunctive list 11 = { w � N lwnw* = 
0} wit4 0 C w* � N.  This is just the interval [0, N \ w*] , and by Lemma B .4 it follows that
F E  Acnc- ,C · 0 
u u-Corollary B .3 A U A C Acne- c- .' 
Proo f: Note that a syndicate operator F is given by a conjunctive list E = { f � Nil* � f} with
0 C f* � N. Then the interval [0, N \ £*] satisfies the condition of Lemma B.5 and it follows
that F E Acne- c- .' 
We know that an anti-syndicate operator F is given by a conjunctive list E = { f � N l £nf* = 
0} with 0 C £* � N . Then the interval [€* , NJ satisfies the condition of Lemma B .5 and it follows
that F E Acne- c- . D ' 
Lemma B .6 Acnc-,c n Acnc-.c- = Acne- · 
Proo f: Consider F E  Acnc- ,c n Acnc-.c- and a profile C E X ieNC n c - .  Then F(C) E C
and F( C) E c - ,  so F E Acne- . Conversely, F E Acne- maps each profile in C n c- to C
and c - ,  so F E Acne- ,c n Acne- .c- . o 
Theorem 13 Acne- n A8N = Ad U Ad- .
Proo f: Obviously, C n c- is closed with respect to complementation, so we have Ad U Ad- �
Acne- n AsN. 
Now consider F E  Acnc- n A8N . By Lemma B.6,  we know that F E  Acnc-,c nAcnc-,c- · 
Lemma B .4 then implies that F is given by an interval [w', w"] such that for every profile C an 
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alternative x is socially chosen from each admissible X if and only if V(x, X; C) E [w', w'1 · And 
Lemma B.5 implies that F is given by an interval [w1 , w2] such that x is socially rejected 
from each admissible X if and only if V ( x, X; C) E [wi , w2] .  It follows immediately that
[w', w'1 = 2N\ [wi ,w2] and [w', w'1 n [wi , w2] = 0. Also from Lemma B.4 we have [w', w'1 1 [0, N] ,
[w', w'1 'I 0 ,  and similarly for [w1 , w2] . Note that F E Ad  if and only if there i s  a d E N such that
[w1 , w2] = [0, N \ {d}] and F E  Ad- if and only if there is a d  E N such that [w1 , w2] = [{ d} , N] .
Suppose that F � Ad and F � Ad- . We consider three cases: 
1 there is a d  E N such that d E w for all w E [wi ,w2] ; 
2 there is a d E N such that d ¢ w for all w E [w1 , w2] ;
3 for all i E N there are wl , w? E [w1 , w2] such that i E wl and i ¢ w?.
We shall see that a contradiction arises in each case, giving us the desired result. 
( 1) Since [wi , w2] 'I [ { d} , N] , there exists an wd � N with d E wd such that wd ¢ [w1 , w2] .
Note that we then have [0, N \  {d}] U {wd} � [w', w'l In particular, N \ wd E [w' ,w"] . It follows 
from Theorem B . 1 that wd n (N \ wd) = 0  e [w', w'1 and that wd U (N \ wd) = N E  [w', w'l But 
then [w', w"] = [0, N] , violating sovereignty. 
(2) Since [wi , w2] 'I [0, N \  {d}] ,  there exists an wd � N with d ¢ wd such that wd � [w1 , w2] .
Note that we then have [ { d} , NJ U { wd} � [w' , w'1 · It follows from Theorem B . 1  that wd n { d} = 
0 E [w', w'1· But then [w', w'1 = [0, N], violating sovereignty. 
(3) Since [wi , w2] is an interval , we know niEN w? = 0 E [wi , w2] and UiENwl = N E  [wi , w2] . 
But then [wi , w2] = [0, N] ,  violating sovereignty. D 
· 
C Proofs of Theorems: Choice Functions 
Theorem 7 The explicit forms of the conditions H- , c- , o - ,  and K- are
(H- ) [X1 � X2] => [C(X1 )  � C(X2 )] ;
cc- ) [Y � X1 n X2 and C(Xi )  n Y = C( X2 )  n Y = 0]
=> [C(X1 U X2) n Y = 0]; 
co- ) [X1 � C(X2)] => [C(X2 \ Xi ) = C(X2 )  \ Xi ] ;
CK- ) [X1 � X2] and [X1 g; C(X2 ) or C(X2) = X2] => [C(X1 )  = C(X2 )  n X1] ,
for all admissible Xi , X2, and Y .  
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Proof: (H- ) Consider admissible X1 � X2 , C E H-,  and x E C(X1 ) .  Then x � c-(X1 ) and 
since c- E H, it follows that x � c-(X2) .  Therefore, x E C(X2) .  
Now consider admissible X1 � X2 and C satisfying the above condition. We know that 
C(X1 ) � C(X2), so c-(X2 )  = X2 \ C(X2) � X2 \ C(X1 ) .  Then c-(X2)  n X1 � (X2 \ C(X1))  n
X1 = X1 \ C(X1 ) = c-(X1 ). Therefore, c- E H  and C E  H-. 
(c-) Consider C E  c-, Y � X1 n X2 admissible, and C(X1 ) n Y = C(X2) n Y = 0 .  Since
Y � X1 and C(X1 ) n Y = 0, we know Y � c-(X1) .  Similarly, Y � c-(X2) .  Since c- E C, it
follows that Y � c- (Xi ) n c- (X2) � c- (X1 U X2) .  Therefore, C(X1 U X2) n Y = 0. 
Now consider C satisfying the above condition .  Let x E c- (Xi ) n c-(X2).  Then {x}  � 
X1 n X2 and C(X1 )  n {x} = C(X2) n {x} = 0,  so C(X1 U X2) n {x}  = 0. We then have
{ x }  � c-(X1 U X2).  Therefore, c- E C and C E  c- . 
(O-) Consider C E  o- and admissible X1 � C(X2).  Then X1 � X2 \ c-(X2) and c- (X2 \
X1 ) = c- (X2) ,  since c- E 0. This implies (X1 \ X2) \ c-(X2 \ X1 ) = (X2 \ X1 ) \ c-(X2) ,  
which implies C(X2 \ X1 ) = (X2 \ c-(X2 )) \ X1 = C(X2)  \ X1 . 
Now consider C satisfying the above condition and admissible X1 � X2 \ c-(X2) .  Then 
X1 � C(X2) ,  so we have C(X2 \ X1 ) = C(X2) \ Xi ,  which implies (X2 \ X1 ) \ C(X2 \ X1) =
(X2 \ X1 ) \ (C(X2) \ X1 ) .  This in turn implies c-(X2 \ X1 ) = [(X2 \ X1 ) \ C(X2)] U [C(X2) n 
X1 n (X2 \ X1 )] = [(X2 \ C(X2 )) \ Xi ] = [C-(X2) \ X1 ] = c- (X2) .  Therefore, c- E 0 and 
C E  o - .  
(K-)  Consider C E K - and admissible X1 � X2 with C(X2) = X2 or X1 � C(X2) •  
First assume C(X2) = X2 . Then c-(X2 )  = 0,  where c- E K.  It follows that c- (X1 ) = 
c- (X2 )  n X1 = 0, so C(Xi ) = X1 = C(X2)  n X1 . 
Next assume X1 � C(X2 ) ,  and suppose that X1 n c- (X2) = X1 n (X2 \ C(X2))  = 0. 
But then X1 � C(X2) ,  a contradiction . So X1 n c-(X2)  f 0, and since c- E K we have 
c- (X1 ) = c-(X2 ) n X1 ,  which implies X1 \ C-(Xi )  = X1 \ (C-(X2 ) n X1 ) . This in turn implies 
C(Xi ) = X1 \ c- (X2) = X1 \ (X2 \ C( X2 ) )  = (X1 \ X2 ) u (X1 n X2 n C(X2))  = X1 n C(X2) .  
Now consider C satisfying the above condition and c- (X2) = 0 or X1 n c- (X2) f 0 for 
admissible X1 � X2 . First assume c-(X2 )  = 0. Then C(X2) = X2 , so C(X1 ) = C(X2) n X1 = 
X1 , which implies c- (X1 ) = 0 = X1 n c- p ;2 ) .  
Next assume X1 n c- (X2) f 0. But then );1 n (X2 \ C{X.2) = X1 \ C(X2) = X1 \ (X2 \
c- cx2))  = (X1 \ Xi )  u (X1 n X2 n c-cx2 ) )  = X1 n c- cx2)  f: 0, so X1 � C(X2) .  Then
C(Xi ) = C(X2) n X1 , which implies X1 \ C(X1 ) = X1 \ (C(X2) n X1 ) .  This in turn implies 
c-(xi )  = (X1 \ C(X2)) u (X1 \ X1 ) = X1 \ (X2 \ c- (X2 ) )  = (X1 \ X2)  u (X1 n X2 n c- (X2))  = 
X1 n c- (X2) .  Therefore, c- E K  and C E  K- . D 
Theorem 10  H n H- = 0 n o- = K· .
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Proof: Consider C E H n H- and set A* = C(A). Then for every admissible X we have
A* n X � C(X) and C(X) � A* n X, which implies C(X) = A* n X and C E K* . That is,
H n H- � K*. It is obvious that K* � H n H-, so equality follows.
Consider C E 0 n o- and set A* = C(A). For an admissible X, partition A \  X into
X1 = (A \ X) n A* and X2 = (A \X) \ A*. Note that X1 � A* and X2 � (A \Xi ) \ (A* \ X1). To 
see this last inclusion, note that X2 = (A \X)\A* � A  \A* = (A \X1 ) \A* = (A \X1 ) \ (A*\X1 ). 
Then C(A\X1)  = A*\X1 and C((A\X1)\X2) = (A*\X1)\X2 = A*nX. But X = (A\Xi)\X2, 
so we have C(X) = A* n X. That is,  0 n o- � K*. It is  obvious that K* � 0 n o- ,  so
equality follows. D 
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